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Abstract
Human behaviour is influenced by many psychological factors such as emotions, whose role is already widely recog-
nised. Another important factor, and all the more so during disasters where time pressure and stress constrain reasoning,
are cognitive biases. In this paper, we present a short overview of the literature on cognitive biases and show how some
of these biases are relevant in a particular disaster, the 2009 bushfires in the South-East of Australia. We provide a pre-
liminary formalisation of these cognitive biases in BDI (beliefs, desires, intentions) agents, with the goal of integrating
such agents into agent-based models to get more realistic behaviour. We argue that taking such ”irrational” behaviours
into account in simulation is crucial in order to produce valid results that can be used by emergency managers to better
understand the behaviour of the population in future bushfires. Keywords: Multi-agent modelling, social simulation,
cognitive biases, BDI paradigm, Victoria bushfires
1 Introduction
The bushfires in Victoria, Australia, on February 7, 2009 (also known as Black Saturday) caused 173 deaths and 414
injuries. Most of the victims were badly prepared to face a fire of such severity and were caught out by surprise
[33, 34]. The population’s behaviour before and on that day is still not fully understood and is sometimes referred to
as being irrational (i.e. people did not behave according to what would objectively be in their best interests). This was
surprising since most of the victims had lived in high fire-risk areas for many years and were aware of the safety issues.
The emergency services expected most of the population in the affected area to evacuate before the fire arrived. This
was not the case, highlighting a problem with Victoria’s crisis management plan, including the communication with the
public.
Agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS) is a technique from Artificial Intelligence (AI) that provides us with
a tool to model human behaviours and to test the effect of several parameters. By specifying the attributes of each
individual (e.g. stress, exhaustion, knowledge, and also fire plans, etc.) at the micro-level, we can observe the overall
behaviour during fires at the macro-level (e.g. the number of people who escape the fire, number of deaths). The
proposed approach is to apply ABMS to the field of crisis management in order to improve evacuation plans. The
application of such a technique has been used previously [22, 8, 12] and it is still a very active area of research. One
of the most recurrent issues is the level of complexity of the agents; should humans be modelled with simple rules,
following the KISS (Keep It Simple, Stupid) principle advocated by [6], or is it better to create more complex agents
that are closer to reality, following the KIDS (Keep It Descriptive, Stupid) principle advocated by [13]?
The specific difficulty of choosing an agent’s level of complexity when trying to model complex human-like agents
has already been discussed [3, 11]. These authors advocate that an agent trying to mimic human behaviour can not
be efficiently modelled with simplistic rules. They concluded that the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) agent architecture
offers some appreciable features such as: ”adaptability, robustness, abstract programming and the ability [for agents]
to explain their behaviour.”
These features are an undeniable asset in order to model and understand the behaviour of the Victorian population
during a fire event. Nonetheless, as stated by [20], the BDI architecture does not capture many aspects of human
behaviour and reasoning. It therefore needs some additional work in order to better mimic human behaviour and serve
as a grounding model for social agents [10]. Throughout this paper we argue that part of this additional work should
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deal with cognitive biases. We advocate that they play an important role in human behaviour and need to be taken
into account when developping a model, especially during crisis situations.
Cognitive biases are known to be mechanisms widely used by the human brain and which are sometimes unadapted
to the situation, leading to mistakes or inaccuracies. Cognitive biases are believed to be found in any strategic decision
process [9]. They are also found in decision-making processes in uncertain situations [35]. Strategic decision making
and deciding under uncertainty are typical cognitive reasoning mechanisms undertaken by people in crisis situations
such as bushfires [1]. In addition, crisis situations impose a time constraint on reasoning. Therefore strategic decision
making and reasoning with imperfect information in limited time are common, making cognitive biases more likely to
happen.
Our overall goal is to build a BDI model [2] of human behaviour in crisis in order to improve social simulations by
better mimicking human behaviour. In light of the information above, we can see that cognitive biases strongly affect
human behaviour during crisis situations. Specifically, they can be the cause of biased perceptions and/or judgements,
leading to dangerous behaviours for oneself and reliant others. As a result, we claim that their integration in agent
models will improve social simulations of crisis situations. The first goal of this paper is to prove this impact of
cognitive biases in crisis situations by identifying some well-known cognitive biases in the victims’ testimonies of the
Black Saturday event. The second goal is then to formalise these cognitive biases in terms of BDI algorithms, in order
to make a first step towards their integration in an agent model for social simulation.
Similar work of integrating cognitive biases in a model has already been performed in the domains of health [37]
and national defense [19]. However none of these models use the BDI paradigm, which is central in our approach.
The following section presents our data set and the methodology used for data extraction. A presentation of the
BDI paradigm follows, with an explanation about the required architecture to implement our BDI model of cognitive
biases. We then describe our formalisation of three cognitive biases in the form of algorithms, and illustrate these biases
with examples from our data set. Finally the conclusion discusses limits of this work and compares our approach to
the literature.
2 Finding and extracting data
The first task in order to ascertain whether or not cognitive biases played a part in Black Saturday victims’ behaviour
is to find relevant data. Black Saturday was the worst fire event Victoria ever suffered, consequently casualties and
material losses were severe. As a result the state of Victoria created several work groups to understand what happened.
Two of them are the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) and the Bushfire Cooperative Research
Centre (Bushfire CRC). These groups drew data from what they could find (e.g. flora, fauna, victims interviews stating
their feelings and memories, police hearings, and general state of the land) and wrote detailed reports [33, 31]. The
data contained in these reports were extensively used in the scope of this work.
2.1 Post Black Saturday reports
Particular attention has been given to the fourth volume of the VBRC final report [32]. It contains 100 statements from
lay witnesses of the Black Saturday events, ordered alphabetically by the witness’ name. Statements are heterogeneous
in terms of content and source (e.g. testimonies from firefighters who helped during the events, information about the
physical and mental state of victims from nurses who came later to help, testimonies of individuals focusing on their
struggle with the insurance companies, testimonies of Black Saturday events from family members who suffered a human
loss, and detailed testimonies of the day from people who survived the events.) They are narrative transcriptions of
oral statements with attached evidence (e.g. photos, maps). Statements are divided into numbered paragraphs and
attempts have been made by the interviewer to create consistent sections throughout the statements when possible
(e.g. fire plan, the property, views previous to Black Saturday, views during Black Saturday).
The bushfire CRC Final report [33] has also been studied in depth. Sections about human behaviour helped in
the formulation of the hypothesis relative to the importance of cognitive biases (e.g. by highlighting the importance of
environmental cues in alerting Victorians and thus the unconscious concealment of other cue types). This report was
also used for the statistics that it contains about the Victorians intentions and actions during Black Saturday. These
statistics were compared to those found in a 2010 survey about the behaviour that Victorians would adopt on Code
Red (i.e. worst conditions for bushfires) days [24], in order to form a more accurate idea of how Black Saturday affected
the Victorians representations of a fire event. This second report concludes by stating that only 3% of Victorians would
leave on a Code Red day, even though they aware that authorities’ advice is to leave early on those days. Only 15%
would stay and defend. This leaves 82% of Victorians in a ”wait and see” state, which is the reason why so many
Victorians were trapped during Black Saturday fires.
2.2 More on cognitive biases
Cognitive bias is a broad and poorly defined concept that encompasses roughly a hundred effective cognitive biases
(see [7] for a large but non-exhaustive list). Some are well known, while others are merely suspected. Some are known
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to be groups of cognitive biases (e.g. the Risky Shift Phenomenon is a cognitive bias discovered in 1960, stating that
decisions made as a group are less conservative than decisions made by the average group member [27]; this can in
fact be caused by other, more specific, cognitive biases). Some are more concerned with affection (loving) [25, 17])than
cognition (thinking). Nonetheless all cognitive biases have two things in common.
First they all serve a common purpose. They help the brain to do its work faster and/or longer, often by using
low-cost mechanisms to make decisions or to filter the amount of information gathered by the brain at any time. For
example, the ”Attribute substitution” mechanism enables us to give the answer to an easy question when confronted
with a difficult one [17] (e.g. when asked the question ”How far is the mountain ?”, if one does not know the answer,
one will answer the question ”How blurred is the mountain compared to the ambient haziness?” instead.)
Second they can be the source of mistakes. Since their purpose is to help the brain to make a decision faster or to
ignore information, it is not surprising to find that these biases can sometimes lead to inaccurate decisions. Nonetheless
it is worth noting that despite the denomination of ”cognitive biases” inaccuracies seem to occur only in specific, rather
uncommon, situations [23].
2.3 Examining the testimonies
Cognitive biases are a wide and heterogeneous family; hence the goal was to find out more about which specific cognitive
bias could be found in Black Saturday testimonies. For this purpose we went manually through 30 of the testimonies
gathered by the VBRC. Since little attention has been given in the past to identifying cognitive biases in testimonies
of populations during crisis situations, no tool exists yet to automatically analyse such interviews. Therefore a new
method had to be designed.
Half of testimonies were ignored, since they could not be of any help (i.e. the interviewee was not talking specifically
about the Black Saturday events). The other half were searched for situations where survivors or deceased people put
themselves at risk. Each such dangerous situation was isolated and we looked for the decision which could have led to it.
Then this decision was interpreted according to a set of well-established cognitive biases. For example Edward Cherry is
in a dangerous situation (p.16) when outside of his house during an ember attack (ember attacks precede the fire front,
which is the most dangerous part of a bushfire event). He took the decision to water the roof of his house a bit longer ,
while his wife was ”shrieking at him to come inside”, before suddenly becoming aware that everything around him was
on fire. This is likely to be caused by an Optimism bias (i.e. a cognitive bias which lead people to under-estimate the
risk of a given situation they are involved in compared to the estimation they would make if not involved). It is worth
noting that at least one cognitive bias or set of cognitive biases potentially leading to each dangerous situation were
found. Sometimes several unique sets were found.
In the following example, several cognitive biases could led to the decision. Brett Savage in Michelle Buntine’s
testimony [32] evacuates his property after having tried to defend it (p.31-32). Earlier, he did not listen to his partner
in life, Michelle Buntine, when she told him repeatedly to evacuate (p.26, 28). He also received a call from a friend who
is a firefighter and who, in order to make him leave, explained to Brett what would happen during the next hours if he
stayed (p.29-30). He stayed and fought the fire for some time before having to evacuate during the fire event.
In terms of cognitive biases it is hard to detect what played a part in Brett’s decision to stay and fight. It could be the
Conservatism bias (i.e. a slow update of his beliefs that he would be safe while defending his property), the Semmelweis
Reflex (i.e he clung to his belief, even with compelling evidence that it was false), an Anchoring effect (i.e. he was
committed to the idea to defend his house), the Optimism bias (i.e. he though he was not at risk in this situation while
someone else would have been) or the Overconfidence effect (i.e. he considered his beliefs as more accurate than the
ones from his partner and friend). The most simple, robust, and consistent with the psychology literature sets were
kept. However, we acknowledge that some may have been missed.
2.4 Retained cognitive biases
The use of our method revealed that some types of cognitive biases were found more often than others: biases about
1) beliefs (i.e. biases acting in favour of, or against, the update of a previous belief), 2) affect (i.e. biases favouring
the option in which something one likes could be preserved over the option in which one is in a safe place) and 3) bad
probability estimation (i.e. some options are seen as far more/less probable than they really are).
Three cognitive biases were chosen, according to this finding and for two other reasons: biases chosen are relevant
to each other (i.e. the same tools can be used to model the three of them, and their interaction creates a logical model
of information processing); they are easily adaptable to the BDI paradigm, which makes an extensive use of the notion
of belief. The three biases are: 1) The Neglect of Probability bias, which belongs to the bad probability estimation
category, 2) the Semmelweis Reflex and 3) the Illusory Truth effect. The last two biases belong to the belief updates
category. No cognitive bias found in the affection category satisfied the conditions and so have not been included.
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3 Proposed BDI model of cognitive biases
3.1 The BDI paradigm
The BDI paradigm describes agents in terms of their mental attitudes (Beliefs, Desires, Intentions), which are ”folk
psychology concepts that straightforwardly match human reasoning as people understand it, making the models easier
to design and to understand” [3].
1. Beliefs represent an agent’s knowledge about the world (e.g. road 45 is blocked, ember attacks precede the fire
front).
2. Desires are the goals of an agent, i.e. their preferred states (e.g. be close to one’s children). They can be
inconsistent (e.g. during an ember attack, the agent might both want to defend its house and to flee the fire).
Choosing between desires is the role of a reasoning engine [21], that remains to be chosen in this work.
3. Intentions are what an agent is committed to do. They are basically refined, practical desires. They have to be
consistent with each other, and should not be dropped easily. The agent usually has a library of plans (sequences
of actions) allowing it to achieve its intentions.
3.2 Required agent model
In this section we describe the required minimal architecture for an agent to be able to implement the cognitive biases.
We do not provide a conceptual agent model, but give a minimal set of requirements for an agent architecture to be
able to implement the cognitive biases algorithms in this paper.
• A belief operator with associated subjective probability, ranging from 0 (certainly wrong) to 100 (certainly true).
The addition of subjective values of a belief and its opposite sum to 100. A belief with a probability of 50 means
that the agent is completely unsure.
• A belief base that stores beliefs.
• Psychological attributes, such as level of risk aversion.
• A table of occurrences of received information (counting how many times the same information have been received)
• A function getBeliefProbability (Belief ϕ) that returns the probability of a given belief.
• A function saveBeliefProbability (Belief ϕ, Number α) that updates the probability of a given belief in the
agent’s belief base.
• A function incrementNumberOfOccurrences(Information ϕ) that increments by 1 the number of times a
given information has been gathered by the agent.
• A function getAcquiredInfoOccurrences(Information ϕ) that returns the number of times the agent has
gathered a given information.
• A function acquireBelief(Belief ϕ, Number α) that saves a given belief and associated probability to the
agent’s belief base.
• The functions dramaticallyIncreaseBeliefProbability (Belief ϕ, Number α) and decreaseBeliefProba-
bility (Belief ϕ, Number α) that modifies the probability of a given belief.
This minimal required architecture may be provided by PLEIAD (an affective agent coded in Prolog [4]) or by
GAMA (an agent-based simulation platform [15] recently enriched with a BDI architecture for the agents [30]).
4 Model of the three biases
In this section we provide a generic model of three cognitive biases using the architecture described above. Only
pseudo-code is described so as not to commit to a particular implementation language.
4.1 Neglect of Probability
We formalise the Neglect of Probability bias in algorithm 1. We begin by explaining what we mean when using the
expression ”are perceived to be...”, then we detail this bias and its mechanisms. Uses of the expression ”are perceived
to be ...” in the formalization of the Neglect of Probability bias are shortcuts for two statements.
• The consequences implied by this belief could be dire or extremely favourable (e.g. for agent A believing that road
R is on fire implies that he could not reach his home, this will leave his home unprotected and at risk of probable
burning; which is a dire event).
• The risk aversion or risk seeking value of the agent makes him perceive the consequences as extremely favourable/unfavourable,
as described in [18].
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The Neglect of Probability bias is composed of three mechanisms. Two of them target low probability beliefs while the
third one targets high and medium probability beliefs.
• The first mechanism (described in [25]) is a way to ignore what is perceived both as unlikely to happen and as
having no consequences. It is formalized on lines 9-10 of algorithm 1. It reads: if the agent estimates something
only has a low chance of being true and has no consequences, then the agent considers it as false.
• The second mechanism (described in [29]) is a way to anticipate an event that would greatly impact one’s life and
thus enables one to prepare for it. It is formalized on lines 11-12 of algorithm 1. It reads: if the agent estimates
that something has a low chance of being true but either desires or dreads it, then the agent considers that it has
a substantial chance of being true.
• The third mechanism (described in [36, 18]) reduces the perception of high and medium probabilities. It is
formalized on lines 13-14 of algorithm 1. It reads: if the agent estimates something has a high or medium chance
of being true, then the agent under-estimates its probability of being true.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for the Neglect of Probability bias
1: procedure updateBeliefProbability (info, perceivedProbability )
2: ancientBeliefProbability ← getBeliefProbability (info)
3: newBeliefProbability ← ancientBeliefProbability + perceivedProbability
4:
5: if newBeliefProbability > 100 then
6: newBeliefProbability ← 100
7: end if
8:
9: if newBeliefProbability is small and consequences are not perceived to be dire and consequences are not perceived
to be extremely favourable then
10: newBeliefProbability ← 0
11: else if beliefProbability is small and (consequences are perceived to be dire or consequences are perceived to be
extremely favourable) then
12: newBeliefProbability ← dramaticallyIncraseBeliefProbability (info, newBeliefProbability)
13: else # newBeliefProbability is medium or high
14: newBeliefProbability ← decreaseBeliefProbability (info, newBeliefProbability)
15: end if
16: saveBeliefProbability (info, newBeliefProbability)
17: end procedure
4.1.1 Alice Barber
Alice Barber is a woman who survived the events but was injured. She lost her house. No children or partner in life are
recorded. She likes to garden and therefore her house is surrounded by vegetation. Prior to the event she possessed a
fire plan, i.e. go to a place that she scouted earlier and identified as a potential shelter, and a fire plan trigger, i.e. act
according to the fire plan as soon as the power is cut in the house.
• The dangerous situation is the fact that she lives in a high risk area with a weak fire plan trigger.
• The decision leading up to the situation is to choose a weak fire plan trigger.
• The Neglect of Probability is highlighted when she testifies about her mental attitude: ”what will happen,
will happen” (p. 7). She does not want to bother herself with costly fire preparations and does not consider a
fire event as dire. Plus she has good reasons to believe that her fire plan trigger is good. Thus neglecting the
probability of such an event.
This situation could be modelled by one agent as follows:
• Beliefs: Fire plan will be triggered before a fire is detected (100)
• Desires: Be safe, Be close to the house
• Intentions: Stay close to the house until the fire plan triggers, then follow fire plan
• Risk aversion: Low
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4.1.2 Andrew Paul Trenwith Berry
Andrew Berry is a married man who survived the events with his wife, Nicole, and his father. Although Andrew and
Nicole made relevant decisions regarding this case, they lost their house. Prior to the events Andrew possessed a house
with a sprinkler-based defense system (considered as the best anyone can do (p. 14) by some Country Fire Authority
(CFA) members) and a bunker that was close to the house that was large enough to accommodate a dozen people. The
fire plan was to stay and defend. The family also experienced fire in 2006. This experience raised their risk aversion.
This example is reversed, since the Neglect of Probability saved the family.
• The safe situation is the fact that Andrew and Nicole were able to shelter inside the bunker while their house
burnt.
• The decision leading up to the situation is to have a the bunker built in the yard, despite a good house
defense system.
• The Neglect of Probability underlies the decision of building the bunker. The 2006 fires raised Nicole and
Andrew’s father risk aversion. Thus the probability associated to the belief of experiencing a fire strong enough to
threaten their lives while sheltered in their apparently well-defended house were overestimated (weather conditions
during Black Saturday were unique and very unlikely).
This situation can be modelled with a single agent as follows:
• Beliefs: House is safe (60), Bunker is comfortable (0), Bunker is safe (70)
• Desires: Be safe, Be comfortable
• Intentions: Stay safe in the house before and during the fire front, then defend it. If not safe in the house, go
to the bunker.
• Risk aversion: High
4.1.3 Fiona Wallace
Fiona has a partner in life named Heather and they both survived Black Saturday. No children are recorded as being
involved. They are both Victorians, living in low fire-risk areas. They went to a Bed and Breakfast (B&B) hostel
located in a high fire-risk area during Black Saturday. They both were aware of the warning issued by the authorities
during the days prior to Black Saturday.
• The dangerous situation occurs when the fire reaches the B&B they are staying in and they have to defend it.
• The decision leading up to the situation is the decision to go on a trip in a high fire risk area while knowing
about the hazardous weather conditions.
• The first Neglect of Probability underlying this decision occurs when Fiona and Heather hear the news about
the weather: ”the comparisons to Ash Wednesday emphasised the severity of the risk and we knew that it was
going to be an extremely bad fire danger day.” (p. 3). The probability of a fire being high in the information
received is being neglected and is considered as medium rather than high.
• The second Neglect of Probability underlying this decision occurs when Fiona and Heather reason about the
probability of having their particular B&B being attacked by fire in such a large area: ”We reasoned that even
when there is a major fire, a huge amount of rural Victoria does not get burnt.” (p.4). This probability ends up
being low. Since their aversion to risk is also low the probability associated to the belief of being caught in a fire
event is neglected.
This situation can be modelled with a single agent, as follows (beliefs in italic can be omitted if a reasoning engine
allows agents to build their own beliefs this way):
• Beliefs: B&B is relaxing (80), B&B is prone to fires (45), B&B will experience a fire event during the trip (0)
• Desires: Be safe, Be relaxed
• Intentions: Go to a safe and relaxing place.
• Risk aversion: Low
4.2 Semmelweis Reflex / Belief Perseverance
The Semmelweis Reflex, also called Belief Perseverance, is a cognitive bias in which people cling to their beliefs even
when they face proofs they are not true [5]. The Semmelweis Reflex is formalized in algorithm 2, based on an explanation
given in [26]; stating that a certainty is harder to update than a belief one thinks is only probable. One of the ways to
”overcome” this bias has been suggested (p. 85 of [26]). This has been modelled in order for the agents to eventually
update their certainty. The way to overcome the bias is based on the repetition of information (e.g. if an agent is certain
of ϕ it needs to get the information ¬ϕ a certain number of times before it will be able to update its former certainty).
This is consistent with the Illusory Truth formalization.
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Algorithm 2 Pseudo-code for the Semmelweis Reflex
1: function testForSemmelweisReflex(info)
2: if getBeliefProbability (info) = 0 and acquiredInfoOccurrences(info) is not enough then
3: return True
4: else # getBeliefProbability (info) > 0 or acquiredInfoOccurrences(info) is enough
5: return False
6: end if
7: end function
4.2.1 John Benett
John lives alone, he survived and, with other people, he successfully defended his house. During the whole afternoon,
John felt a North wind blowing. At 3pm he received a call from a friend, warning him that a fire was coming from the
West to his property. John ignored this warning. Later, he saw people driving dangerously near his property. He did
not pick up on these cues either.
• The dangerous situation occurs at 5pm when a fire caught John by surprise. It came from the West while a
North wind was blowing.
• The decision leading up to the situation is to ignore cues going against his belief that no fire could come
from the West while the wind was blowing from the North.
• The Semmelweis Reflex underlying this decision prevents him from considering cues contrary to his belief that
the fire will come from the North, as he states: ”I thought that the North wind would prevent the fire from
reaching Kinglake West and that it would direct it somewhere else.” (p. 7)
This can be modelled in one agent as follows:
• Beliefs: House is safe (100), Fire goes in the same direction as the wind (100), Fire will come from [current
wind direction] (100)
• Desires: Be safe, Defend the house
• Intentions: Monitor [current wind direction] side of the land to gather environmental cues about an approaching
fire, then proceed to defend the house.
4.2.2 Jim Baruta
Jim is married but his wife was not involved in the events. He survived but lost his house.
• The dangerous situation occurs at 5pm when when he drove on a road during a fire event (p.15).
• The decision leading up to the situation is to to keep driving even though he saw smoke and fire spots on
the road.
• The Semmelweis Reflex occurs after at least one other cognitive biases was triggered (e.g. Optimism Bias) to
build a certainty about the fact that he would be safe travelling home even though he knows he should not be
doing it: ”[in case of fire] you can’t get on the roads, that is the last thing you should do” (p. 10). The Semmelweis
Reflex prevents him considering cues that are contrary to his belief that he will be safe on the road.
This can be modelled in one agent as follows:
• Beliefs: The road home is safe (100), Do not be on the road during a fire event (80)
• Desires: Be safe, Defend the house
• Intentions: Go home then proceed to prepare and defend the house.
• Risk aversion: Extremely low
4.3 Illusory Truth
The Illusory Truth bias was shown for the first time in 1977 [16] and has proven to be quite robust. Its effect is
straightforward: the more one hears some information, the more one is inclined believe that the information is true.
The Illusory Truth effect also ignores prior knowledge [14], which makes it easier to formalize. It is formalized in
algorithm 3, on lines 8-12. It reads: if the current agent already possesses a belief relative to the last information it
gathered, then reinforce the belief according to the credit it puts in this information, multiplied by the number of times
it gathered it. This has been implemented regarding processing fluency [14]. According to the author the Illusory Truth
would come from the fact that repetition makes information easier to understand. Processing fluency states that the
easier something is to understand the more truthful it appears. In our algorithm, on line 10, the probability associated
with an information perceived is linked to the number of times this same information has already been perceived.
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Algorithm 3 Pseudo-code for the Illusory Truth effect
1: # ϕ is an information given by the environment to an agent
2: info ← perceive(ϕ)
3: perceivedProbability ← perceiveProbability (ϕ)
4: incrementNumberOfOccurrence(info)
5:
6: if not hasBelief(info) then
7: acquireBelief(info, perceivedProbability )
8: else # hasBelief(info)
9: if not testForSemmelweisReflex(info) then
10: illusoryProbability ← perceivedProbability * acquiredInfoOccurences(info)
11: updateBeliefProbability (info, illusoryProbability)
12: end if
13: end if
4.3.1 Peter Ross Brown
Peter Brown is a married man with three children (aged 20, 18 and 16). He lives with his wife and children in their
own house with a pool. The pool is intended to serve as a water tank in case of a fire event. During Black Saturday
Peter’s oldest child was away. Peter also listened to ABC radio during the entire day. The whole family survived the
events but lost the house.
• The dangerous situation occurs when the family members are gathered in and around the pool and the fire
unexpectedly strikes.
• The decision leading up to the situation is for the family not to evacuate and not to prepare the house before
the fire arrived. Peter was trying to connect the fire pump to the pipes when it did.
• The Illusory Truth makes Peter believe in the accuracy of ABC announcements, since the ABC announcer
repeated that they provided the most up-to-date source of information concerning the bushfire (p. 16). Next
Peter reasons that since there was no warning from ABC for his area it means that his house and family are not
threatened.
This situation can be modelled with a single agent as follows:
• Beliefs: ABC Radio provides up-to-date information (100), No fire is detected in my area (100)
• Desires: Be safe, Defend the house, Do not prepare the house if not needed
• Intentions: Monitor for a threat by listening to the best radio channel found and looking at the environment,
proceed to prepare the house if a fire is detected.
• Risk aversion: Medium
4.3.2 Michael Halls
Michael is the father of Natasha Davey. His daughter died during the Black Saturday along with her family. The family
was sheltering inside their house, which had been well prepared and was defended by Natasha’s husband.
• The dangerous situation occurs when the family is in the house while a fire is coming.
• The decision leading up to the situation is to stay and defend the house.
• The Illusory Truth makes Natasha believe that a well-prepared and defended house is a safe place in case of
a fire event. Michael Halls testifies that his daughter’s family has been reading brochures, comparing what they
were going to do in the face of a fire to what their neighbours were going to do (which was more), and went to
CFA meetings (p.7 - 13, 29). Furthermore, the CFA brochures they consulted implied that if one is well prepared,
one has nothing to fear from a fire (p. 38, ”Why does the bushfire guide show pictures of children protecting a
property?”).
This situation can be modelled with a single agent as follows:
• Beliefs: The house is well prepared (80), I can defend the house (80), My husband can defend the house (80),
A well-prepared and defended house is safe (100), The house is comfortable (80)
• Desires: Be safe, Have the children in a safe area, Have the children being comfortable
• Intentions: Monitor fire threat from inside the house. In case of a fire event, shelter in the house then defend
it.
• Risk aversion: Medium-High
8
5 Conclusion and future work
Psychology and cognitive science related works show that cognitive biases affect human behaviours in crisis situations,
where uncertainty or stress factors are present. Examples of individuals putting themselves, their friends or their family
at risk by acting in a way that was not anticipated by decision-makers have been extracted from a concrete set of data.
These behaviours were then connected to cognitive biases. Three specific cognitive biases have been formalized into
algorithms, which are consistent with their related bias description in the literature. We argue that implementing these
algorithms in BDI agents can make them more realistic by addressing some of BDI core issues (as identified by [20]) in
terms of 1) decision making, 2) inaccuracies and 3) situation awareness of agents.
This work though should be considered preliminary. We provided algorithms to ease implementation of the biases,
which constitutes a good basis for a computational model, but we have not implemented and tested them yet. These
algorithms, although not yet implemented constitute a good basis for a computational model and ease implementation.
The methodology used to find occurrences of cognitive biases in our data set should also be treated as a work
in progress. Since it is not based on any scientifically-grounded model of cognitive biases (we could not find any
both exhaustive and reliable), it relies on disparate scientific evidence. Results are therefore based on a subjective
interpretation of the testimonies.
Scarce examples of models integrating cognitive biases can be found. This work can be compared to two of them.
The first is in the field of national defense [19], while the other is in the field of health [37].
The national defense model aims to predict a target’s reaction to ”Effect-Based Operation” (EBO) (e.g. the 9/11
events in the U.S.). It is based on a ”Synthetic Cognitive Modelling” (SCM) approach, which takes several factors
into account and gives probabilistic results. While their work aims to predict how an EBO would affect a target,
we are trying to understand why a population reacts the way it does in a crisis situation. This explains the use of
different paradigms. We make use of a white box (i.e. something we can see into) paradigm (BDI), in order to explain
behaviours. Eventually we would like to build a serious game to experiment with the impact of different factors on
the population. This work in national defense uses a black box (SCM) paradigm, looking only at inputs (data), and
outputs (behaviours). Their approach of cognitive biases also differs from ours, since they do not offer any framework
to integrate identified cognitive biases or mind mechanisms in their model.
The model in the health field is based on mathematical functions and thus uses a white box approach. It aims to
help understanding why individuals in developed and developing regions can be reluctant to vaccination, even though
”vaccination has greatly reduced the burden of infectious diseases worldwide”. The authors advocate that models
should not assume individuals to be rational, which bring our work close to theirs. This irrationality is modelled using
using a standard model made for capturing the disease transmission process, augmented by a belief model and two
functions representing two distinct cognitive biases. However, the belief model is far simpler than the one implemented
in BDI and only takes into account two parameters for each individual (epidemiological status and opinion). Our work
is closer to this model than to the previous one, even though this model is mathematically based. However this work
uses the KISS principle, in which things are as simple as possible, while ours is more descriptive.
Two areas for future work are planned. First, more work is needed on the conceptual side of our cognitive biases
model in order to refine how it integrates with the underlying formal semantics of BDI agents. Second, we want to
implement and test the biases that we have presented in order to validate our hypothesis. The implementation may
then be enhanced in several ways. The Belief Perseverance Effect implementation will be complemented by the addition
of other ways to overcome the fallacy as described in [26], along with a way to slow down the belief-updating process
(i.e. Conservatism bias). The Illusory Truth Effect will be widened by the implementation of the processing fluency
mechanism. In a more general way, this work would benefit from the formalisation of trust, which can affect perceived
probabilities. The affective heuristic [28] will also be integrated, along with work on an ”affective weight” agents give
to their environment. This will help us understand how agents integrate and contextualize objects in the world.
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